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BETWEEN LAW AND VIRTUE
Joseph P. Tomain·
Barbara C. Watts··

INTRODUCTION

Legal ethics and professionalism have not enjoyed a comfortable
alliance throughout the history of the legal profession in this country.
Even before the concept of professionalism attained its current notoriety,
ethics scholars, code drafters, and committee reporters addressing legal
ethics have found it difficult to satisfy two needs ofprofessional behavior.
The first need is for a disciplinary code to guide lawyer conduct so that
the profession can police itself and maintain public confidence. The
second need is for an aspirational code of directions for leading a good
life as a lawyer. It may well be the case that the profession cannot
capture these two perhaps incompatible needs in one document;
understanding the relationship between legal ethics and professionalism
remains important, nevertheless. Such an understanding can lead not
only to greater awareness of professionalism, but can also lead to
educational opportunities for law students and lawyers alike.
Legal ethics, professional responsibility, and professionalism are
timely topics as lawyers continually reevaluate the standards of their
profession, particularly in light of the challenges of multidisciplinary and
multijurisdictional practice, as well as the embarrassment facing lawyers
involved in and surrounding the Enron collapse.
In this article, our goal is to discuss how to think and talk about ethics
and professionalism. By way of preview, we need to understand that
ethics and professionalism use different vocabularies and, consequently,
talk past each other to some extent. Our hope is that understanding the
existence of these two vocabularies helps reduce the misunderstanding.
Both the areas of legal ethics and of professionalism are dynamic and
both are a part oflegal education and continuing professional education.
Legal ethics and professional responsibility have been a required part of
legal education since Watergate. Today, professionalism and professional training are becoming an increasing part of law school and post
law school instruction. I
*
**

Dean & Nippert Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
Associate Dean, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
I. Such training is an accreditntion requirement. ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDt:C. & Amnsslo:-,;s TO
THE BAR, STA;\DARDS FOR ApPROVAL FOR LAW SCHOOLS § 302(b) (1998). Section 302(b) provides:
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In Part I we trace briefly the history of legal ethics in the United
States and discuss the fundamental conflict that prevents aspiration and
discipline from residing in the same space. Part II elaborates on the
concept of professionalism and discusses current efforts to give content
to professionalism for purposes of teaching it to law students and
promoting it with lawyers.
I. LEGAL ETHICS

A. The Virtue of Princes
According to legend, just before his death on 21 June 1527, Niccolo
Machiavelli told the faithful friends who had stayed with him to the
very end about a dream he had had, a dream that over the centuries
became renowned as "Machiavelli's dream."
In his dream, Machiavelli had seen a band of poorly dressed men,
ragged and miserable in appearance. He asked them who they were.
They replied, "We are the saintly and the blessed; we are on our way
to Heaven." Then he saw a crowd of solemnly attired men, noble and
grave in appearance, speaking seriously of important political matters.
In their midst he recognized the great philosophers and historians of
antiquity who had written fundamental works on politics and the state,
such as Plato, Plutarch, and Tacitus. Again, he asked them who they
were and where they were going. "We are the damned of Hell" was
their answer. After telling his friends of his dream, Machiavelli
remarked that he would be far happier in Hell, where he could discuss
politics with the great men of the ancient world, than in Heaven,
where he would languish in boredom among the blessed and the
saintly.2

What does Machiavelli's dream have to tell us about legal ethics?
Simply, Machiavelli, more particularly his notion of virtU, defines our
modern understanding of legal ethics. Machiavelli's virtU separated
morality from politics. A good politician was someone who could
acquire and maintain power. According to Machiavelli, it is not at all
necessary for a good politician to be a good man, desirable though that

A law school shall require all students in the J.D. program to receh'e instruction in the
history, goals, structure, duties, values, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its
members, included in the I'dodd Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar
Association. A law school should involve members of the bench and bar in this instruction.
Professionalism continuing legal education is also required in Ohio. SCPo CT. RCLES FOR THE GO"'T OF
OHIOX-.
2. !\[ACRIZIO VI ROLl, NICCOLO'S S~IILE: A BIOGRAPHY OF MACHI.<\ "ELLI 3 (Anthony Shugaar
trans., 2000).
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may be. Similarly today, a good lawyer plays just within the disciplinary
rules and need not be a good man, desirable though that may be.
Before returning t6 Machiavelli, however, we need to review another,
somewhat more modem, quotation only about 165 years old from
Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America: "Hidden at the bottom of
the souls oflawyers one therefore finds a part of the tastes and habits of
the aristocracy.,,3 When de Tocqueville linked lawyers with the
aristocracy he did not do so pejoratively. Quite the opposite. He saw
American lawyers as protectors against abuses by the democratic
majority. For de Tocqueville, "Lawyers therefore form the superior
political class and the most intellectual position of society.,,4
Machiavelli and de Tocqueville may seem, may even be, an odd
pairing, odder still for a look at contemporary legal ethics. However,
the connection is simply this: In early 19th century America, at the
dawn of American legal ethics, de Tocqueville perceived lawyers as
aristocrats, as princes. Then who better than Machiavelli to describe
the "virtue" of princes. Coincidentally, or even ironically, Machiavelli's
conception of princely virtue is exactly that adopted by and embedded
in 21 st century legal ethics codes. This sleight-of-hand traveling through
the centuries is a remarkable story, and the conclusion is best understood by what legal ethics is not. Legal ethics is not professionalism.
Also, today's legal ethics is not morality-it is regulatory politics.
Machiavelli's dream of politics is as true for lawyers today as it was for
ambitious would-be Renaissance diplomats.

B. United States History
The standard story oflegal ethics in the United States finds its roots
in the not so dim mists of the early 19th century and remains the current
story we tell. . This history· reveals the tension between the formal
disciplinary rules of professional behavior and the desire for a broader
moral ethos. 5
David Hoffman, a Baltimore lawyer, has been called the father of
American legal ethics. 6 As an educator, Hoffman offered a course of
legal study first published in 1817 and later published in two volumes in

3. ALEXIS DE TOCQt:EVILLE, DE~IOCRACY 1:,\ A~IERICA 252 (Harvey C. l\lanslield & Delba
Winthrop trans., 2000).
4. /d. at 256.
5. See, t.g., Allen K. Harris, Th; Professionalism Crisis-Tht ".(''' lVord5 and Olhtl' Rambo Tactics: 77lt
Cotiftl'mce if ChidJustice Solutions, 53 S.C.L. REV. 549 (2002); W. Bradley Wendel, Xonlegal Regultztion if the
11gal Profession: Social.Yurms in Prifessional Communities, 54 \'A:-\D. L. REV. 1955 (2001).
6. THmlAS L. ScHAFFER, A~IERICA:-\ LEG.<\L ETHICS 59 (1985).
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1836. It was the later edition in which he listed "Some Rules for a
Lawyer's Conduct Throughout Life." The rules contain fifty "Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment" such as: respond to letters
(Rule 36); avoid envy (Rule 37); do not disregard the feelings of
witnesses under examination (Rule 42); and avoid avarice (Rule 49).7
Hoffman's work clearly imports then-contemporary morality into his
understanding of legal ethics. Indeed, he proclaims that it is the office
of the legal vocation "to vindicate the laws of God and man." He
counsels that if a lawyer is "persuaded that [a] client's claim or defense
cannot, or rather ought not to be sustained, [the lawyer] will promptly
advise him to abandon it.,,8 Hoffman's sense oflegal ethics is clearly one
of personal morality in which he admonishes lawyers to adopt good
morals as habit or virtue. 9
A bit of local pride requires us to mention that the first dean of the
University of Cincinnati College of Law, Timothy Walker, was also
instrumental in the development oflegal ethics. His book, Introduction to
American Law, first published in 1837, was the key legal text for American
students of law for most of the 19th century, including no lesser a
personage thanJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Most of Walker's book
involves substantive law, but at the end he addresses legal ethics as he
describes for his readers the "ways and means of professional success."
There is something modern, maybe timeless, about Walker's critical
attitude toward lawyers. He writes: "The vulgar notion is, that lawyers
are seldom honest men." And lawyers are considered "errant naves."
Walker concludes his set oflectures with an admonishment of the need
for professional integrity. A career in law is not the path to riches,
rather it is the path to independence, "which is all a wise man need
desire."JO For Walker, the keys to successful practice are knowledge of
the law; dedication; professional integrity; and the avoidance of
"pettifogging." JJ Walker's opinion oflawyers clearly is more realistic
and closer to our own while Hoffman's is more hopeful. Walker's
approach is more "Thou Shall Not" rather than "Blessed be the
Peacemaker." And to put the matter another way, for Walker, legal
ethics is about conduct that is prohibited rather than about behavior
that will make a lawyer a better person, as Hoffman hoped.

7. DAVID HOFF~JA:-;, A COt.:RSEOF LEGALSTt.:DY 767-75 (2d ed. 1846).
8. Id. at 754 (emphasis added).
9. Ethics as virtue, or ''''irtue ethics" has a distinguished lineage. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE,
NICmIACHAE:-; ETHICS; ALO\SDAIR !\[AC[:\TYRE, AHER \'IRTt.:E (2d ed. 1984); jt.:STI:-; OAKLEY & DEA:-;
COCKI:-;G, \'IRTt.:E ETHICS A:-;D PROFESSIO:O\AL ROLES (200 I).
10. TI~IOTHY WALKER, I:\TROnt.:CTlO:-; TO A~IERICA:-; LA\\" 670 (II th ed. 1905).

II. /d. at 670-71.
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Judge George Sharswood of Philadelphia followed Hoffman and
Walker, and his 1854 Essay on Profissional Ethics I2 became the standard
and most influential work on the subject. With Sharswood, professional
ethics takes a formal tum as Sharswood adopts a position familiar to us.
The guilty client, for example, can be represented because it is a
lawyer's duty to do so, and it is the system, not the individual lawyer,
that judges guilt or innocence based upon fair arguments arising from
the evidence. Thus, early on, between Hoffman and Sharswood, the
development of legal ethics revealed the tension between moral
prescription and formal disciplinary rule.
The first code of professional ethics was adopted by the Alabama
State Bar Association in 1887 13 and was based upon Sharswood's
lectures. Thirty years later, the American Bar Association adopted its
first canons of ethics based on the Alabama code. Both the Alabama
Code of Ethics and the 1908 ABA Canons set out a series of duties to be
observed by lawyers, such as upholding the institution and laws of the
state and of the United States and the need for respect of courts,judges,
each other, clients, and the public. Largely hortatory, the 1908 Canons
were addressed to trial lawyers. It must be noted that these rules had no
legal effect until they were adopted by individual states and enforced by
that jurisdiction's courts in lawyer disciplinary actions. 14
The 1908 Canons served as a forerunner to the 1969 ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which was the outcome of
a committee appointed in 1964 by then ABA President Louis F. Powell,
Jr. Like the 1908 Canons, the CPR did not have the force oflaw until
adopted by a state, usually a state's supreme court. Unlike the 1908
Canons, the CPR had more disciplinary bite.
The CPR was widely adopted and consists of four parts: Canons,
Disciplinary Rules, Ethical Considerations, and Definitions. Notably,
versions of the CPR remain in effect in Ohio, New York, and other
states. 15 The Canons set norms, such as " [a] lawyer should represent a
client zealously within the bounds of the law.,,16 A Canon is followed by
Ethical Considerations which elaborate on this duty, such as "[w]hile
serving as an advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client
doubts as to the bounds of the law."I7 Ethical Considerations are

12. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (3d ed. 1869).
13. I\tP. Armstrong,Jr.,A Century qfLegal Ethics, 64 A.B.A.]. 1063 (1978).
14. CHARLES W. WOLFRA~I, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2 (1986).
15. In addition to New York and Ohio, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, Oregon, and Tennessee still reiyon
the CPR. THO~!AS D. MORGAN & RO:,\ALD D. ROTCNDA, 2002 SELECTED STA:'\DARDS 0:'\
PROFESSIO:,\ALRESPO:,\SIBIUTY 146-47 (2002).
16. OHIO REV. CODE Ax:'\. CODE OF PROF'L RESPOXSIBIUTY Canon 7 (1970).
17. /d. at EC 7-3.
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interpretive guides and, thus, are aspirational as opposed to prescriptive
and contain no disciplinary force.
The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory and "state the minimum level
of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action." 18 In Disciplinary Rule 7-101, for example, a lawyer
may be disciplined if his representation extends to "conduct that [a
lawyer] believes to be unlawfu1.,,19
The 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility was subject to its own
criticisms. Discipline is narrowly imposed; the CPR is also written
mainly for trial lawyers rather than transactional or in-house lawyers;
aspirational goals go unrealized; and the CPR does not keep pace with
a profession remarkably changed by technological advances, increasing
competition, and decreasing loyalty.
Simply, a one size fits all code of ethical behavior and professional
responsibility is inadequate to contemporary professional needs. As the
size of the profession significandy increased, private law firms got larger,
the practice oflaw diversified in terms of demographics, practice areas,
and career tracks, and law became more technology driven and more
complex as well as more "professionalized" as firms turned to marketing
and public relations. 20 Changes in government regulation, multijurisdictional practice, class action lawsuits, and institutional litigation all contributed to a demand for a reappraisal of the CPR.
ABA leadership appointed a committee in 1977 that redrafted the
Code of Professional Responsibility through the leadership of Omaha,
Nebraska lawyer Robert]. Kutak. The Kutak Commission served from
1977 to 1983, at which time the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules) were issued. The Model Rules were controversial because of their more ambitious proposals, such as limiting client
confidentiality; mandating pro bono work by every lawyer; limiting the
kinds of cases that the lawyer could accept; regulating of conflicts
aggressively; requiring a full disclosure and fairness in trials and

18. /d. at PREFACE.
19. /d. at DR 7-101(B)(2).
20. Changes in the legal profession have been dramatic over the last two decades and critics have
been unsparing in their criticism. The most recent criticism has been sounded on a particularly trenchant
note-most of it comes from legal professionals-Iawyers,judges, and law teachers-rather than from the
public. See A1\'THONYKRO:-lMAN, THELOsTL"I\"YER: FAIUNG ID.EALSOFTHELEGALPROFESSIO:-l (1993);
1'...IARY A:-IN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER L"WYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFF~~SION IS
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); SOL LlNOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFE.~SION: L"WYERING
AT THE END OF THE 20TH CE1\'TURY (1994); DEBORAH L.RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFOR~HNG THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); WALTER BENNETT, THE L"WYER'S MYTH: REVIVING
IDEAI_~ IN THE LEGAL PROFE.~SION (2001); WILUA~f H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OFJUSTICE: A THEORY
OF LA\WER'S ETHICS (1998).
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negotiations; and expanding permissible limits on advertising and
solicitation.
The Model Rules begin with a Preamble setting underlying philosophy. The Scope section attempts to place the Model Rules in a larger
context. The bulk of the Model Rules is taken up with fifty-two Rules
with explanatory commentary. Some of the rules are pointedly
disciplinary in nature. Others provide for more discretion and may
involve discipline. Others are prescriptive only. Again, the Model Rules
succeed more as a minimal disciplinary code than as a behavioral guide.

C. Ethics 2000 and The Law Governing Lawyers
The controversy surrounding the Model Rules and the growing
popular dissatisfaction with the legal profession led to the appointment
of yet another ABA commission to undertake a comprehensive review
of the 1983 Model Rules.
In 1997, the ABA appointed a Commission on the Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, chaired by Chief Justice E. Norman
Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court, and that body, known as the
Ethics 2000 Commission, issued its report in November of 2000. 21
According to the Report, one of the reasons to evaluate the Model Rules
was the growing disparity in state ethics codes. The Report states that
forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted some version
of the Model Rules and that significant differences in the state versions
resulted in significant lack of uniformity.
In addition to the disparities in the ethics codes among the states, the
Ethics 2000 Commission felt that technological developments so gready
affected the delivery of legal services that the explosive dynamics of
modern law practice sent "a sense of urgency" to the project,22
Ethics 2000 retains the "basic architecture,,23 of the Model Rules and
the sense that the primary function of the rules is disciplinary, rather
than a set of "best practices" or professionalism concepts. Ethics 2000
reintroduces the basic tension between ethics and professionalism. The
Commission dearly opted to maintain a set of rules that established
minimum standards that must be achieved before subjecting a lawyer to
disciplinary practices, as opposed to the aspirational values of professionalism concepts. The Commission "tinker[ed] with the ... Model

21. ABA, REPORT OF THE CmnnSSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIO:-lAL
CO:-lDUCT (2000) [hereinafter ETHICS 2000].

22. ld. at xi.
23. ld. at xii.
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Rules"24 and made a large number of small changes, the most significant
of which involved communications with clients, informed consent,
allocation of authority, confidentiality, and conflicts. What is more
noteworthy is what the Commission did not do. It did not amend
prohibitions on multidisciplinary practice, nor did it vote to make pro
bono service mandatory, rather keeping it voluntary.
In summer 2001 the ABA House of Delegates began to review Ethics
2000, and the provisions that captured most of the publicity indicate the
endurance of Machiavelli's dream. Rule 1.6(b) of Ethics 2000 proposed
that a
lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation ofa client
to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(I) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
[and]
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services[.]

Mter a scholastic debate worthy of St. Thomas Aquinas, the House
adopted (I) and struck (2). At first glance, certainly we can all agree that
life is more important than property. Yet, as lawyers, how do we really
feel about furthering crime? Would the House of Delegates vote the
same way post-Enron/ Arthur Andersen? What would David Hoffman
have said? Or de Tocqueville for that matter? Most likely, Machiavelli
would have approved.
While the ABA's Ethics 2000 was under consideration, the American
Law Institute was concluding its fifteen-year restatement project entitled
1he Law Governing Lawyers. Although intended as complementary to the
CPR and the Model Rules, the Restatement goes "well beyond the
scope of the ethics codes in alljurisdictions."25 More particularly, while
the bite of ethics codes lies in disciplinary proceedings that can result in
suspension or disbarment, the Restatement addresses civil liability
through malpractice and recognizes civil liability to non-clients. While
the Restatement undertakes to restate much of the law governing
lawyers, it does not cover all of it and is not co-extensive with the ethics
codes. The Restatement, for example, omits extensive consideration of
advertising and solicitation, the right to counsel, group legal services,
and court-awarded attorney fees.

24. Sleven C. Krane, Ethics 2000; I Vhat Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. L. REV. 323 (1999).
25.

RF_~TATE~iE:\T (THIRD) OF THE Lo\\\' Gm'ER:-<I:-<G LO\\\,YERS (2001).
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The distinguishing feature between Ethics 2000 and the Restatement
is the function each assumes regarding the regulation oflawyer conduct.
Ethics 2000 clearly rejects assuming a regulatory function,26 while the
Restatement embraces it, albeit to a limited extent. 27 The Restatement
recognizes that lawyer behavior is regulated by moral, professional, and
legal constraints while focusing on the legal constraints affecting
discipline and liability. Like all of the ALI restatements, 1he Law
Governing Lawyers is both comprehensive and scholarly, so scholarly in
fact that it may well be of more use to law professors than to daily
practitioners. Nevertheless, it provides an important compendium of
decisional law should one ever need it.

D. 1he Virtue rif Princes Redux
Having traced the history of ethics codes from 1817 Baltimore to
Chicago 2001, it is time to return to Machiavelli.
By all accounts, Niccolo Machiavelli was a true Renaissance
humanist28 whose thought was best realized in his enduring job
application to Lorenzo de Medici-1he Prince. 29 But what does a book
written over 450 years ago by a sometime Florentine bureaucrat have
to say to us down through the centuries? Particularly a book so often
referred to dismissively as a how-to manual? Today we can expect to
find a shelf or two devoted to Machiavelli in the self-help section of the
local bookstore stocked with such titles as: Machiavelli and Management;
1he Princessa: Machiavellifor Women; or Machiavelli on Modern Leadership.30
It would not be surprising to find a volume entitled Machiavelli for

Lawyers.
1he Prince is generally considered the first great work of modem
political theory, mostly for the way it decoupled morality from action.
Indeed, it can be said that Machiavelli stood Aristotelian virtue ethics on

26. ETHICS 2000, supra note 21, at xii.
27. RESTATE~fE:\, (THIRD) OFTHE L"w GOVER"I"G L"WYERS (2000).
28. See, e.g., QUE:\,IN SKIi\'"ER, MACHI." VEW (1981); HARVEY C. MA:'\SFIELD, MACHI."VEU..I'S
VIRTUE (1966); I\IACRIZIO VIROU, NICCOLO'S SMILE (2000); LEo STRAUSS, THOUGHTS 0"
MACHI." VEW (1958).
29. Recent useful editions include: NICCOLO MACHIAVEW, THE PRI"CE (Angelo M. Codevil\a
trans., 1997); NICCOLO MACHIAVELU, THE PRI"CE (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., 1998); NICCOLO
MACHI." VELU, THE PRINCE (Robert M. Adams trans., 1992).
30. MACHIAVEW, MARKETI:-IG AND MA:-IAGEME;Io, (Phil Harris et al. eds., 2000); A',HO"YJAY,
MA:'\AGDIE:\, A:,\D MACHIAVEW (1994); MICHAEL ARTHCR LEDEE:,\, MACHIAVELU 0:'\ MODER:'\
LEADERSHIP: WHY MACHIAVEW'S IRO" RULES ARE AS TI~IELY A:-ID hfPORTAlI.' TODAY AS FIVE
CE"TCRIES AGO (2000); AUSTAIR MCALPI:-IE, THE NEW MACHIAVEW: THE ART OF POUTICS IN
BCSI:'\ESS (1998); HARRIET RCBI:-I, THE PRINCESSA: MACHI." "ELLI FOR WmlE" (1998).
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its head and redefined the term. 31 Again, the simple and stark theme of
The Prince is that a successful prince was defined by how effectively he
could acquire and maintain power. Not so different from a lawyer
building a practice in a competitive world. Machiavelli's redefinition of
virtue makes the Socratic question: "How should I live the good life?"
subordinate or irrelevant to power politics just as the question "Can a
good lawyer be a good person?" has become irrelevant for ethics
codes. 32 Indeed, according to The Prince, goodness can only be used in
service of power, it has no value on its own. Similarly, ethics codes are
about keeping your license rather than improving your soul.
Machiavelli's central claim aboutthe behavior of princes echoes the
basic tension that divides ethics and professionalism into a set of formal
rules for behavior and discipline and into a separate set of aspirational
standards. Former Harvard law professor and jurisprude, Lon Fuller,
called this divide between ethics and professionalism a divide between
the "morality of duty" and the "morality of aspiration.,,33
Similarly to The Prince, the discussion of the moral or amoral nature
oflawyer behavior is analogous to Holmes's bad man. ·Holmes is often
wrongly quoted on this point. In The Path ofthe lAw34 Holmes wrote that
to study law, and here we would say its ethics codes, one is best served by
doing so as a bad man to understand its limits before suffering its
penalties, even while acknowledging that the "law is the witness and
external deposit of our morallife.,,35
The Prince provides a departure point to discuss the ethical and moral
obligations of being a lawyer. For those lawyers who find solace in
minima, again like Holmes's bad man, legal ethics rules are to be read
narrowly and taken right up to the limit. For lawyers who believe that
the profession embodies a broader sense of responsibility and justice, a
discussion of professionalism provides some guidance.

II. PROFESSIONALISM
Many legal professionals believe that disciplinary codes do not go far
enough, particularly if we are to improve public trust in the profession
and reverse growing dissatisfaction among lawyers. While the history
31. See, e.g., QL'E:'o.'TIN SKINNER, MACHIAVEU..I \'i (1981). ("And I ha\'e held to my belief that
l\lachiavelli's pivotal concept oft'irtU (t'ir/US in Latin) cannot be translated into modern English by any single
1I'0rd or manageable series of periphrases. ").
32. See THE GOOD LAWYER: L<\WYERS' ROLES AND L.<\\WERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1984);
DAVID LL'BAN, L<\\\'YERS ANDjVSTICE: AN ETHICAL STL'DY (1988).
33. LoN L FL'I.LER, THE I\IORAUTYOF L.o\\\' 4 (2d ed. 1969).
34. Olh'cr Wendell Holmes, Tht Path tifthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
35. /d. at 459.
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of legal ethics codes is instructive, presenting as it does the tension
between discipline and aspiration, it is less instructive on how to
navigate that tension. Instead, the path from minimum rules to
aspirational goals requires other guides, and the current guide of choice
is the concept of professionalism.

A. Introduction
Although professionalism has captured the attention of the legal
profession from law schools to state supreme courts, it is a mistake to
equate it with legal ethics. Here we take the view that professionalism
is a broad concept, encompassing the lawyer's obligation not only to
adhere to disciplinary rules, but also to undertake the lifelong challenges
ofmaintaining competence, acting with integrity, serving the public, and
seeking justice. Because these four challenges should become a
significant part of a lawyer's life, that part should begin to be developed
in law school.
Thinking about professionalism in the context onegal education, and
particularly new student Qrientation,36 offers several advantages. First,
new law students bring few preconceptions to what experienced
attorneys may regard as the overworked notion of "professionalism.,,37
U njaded, they can think freshly and even idealistically about the concept
of professionalism. Presenters, whether legal educators or practitioners,
offered this tabula rasa, have a rare opportunity to think creatively about
first principles of professionalism and what might be said on the first day
of law school to instill the commitments undertaken by beginning the
study of law. Second, such beginning instruction forms the essential
foundation for more complex notions of professional responsibility that
will carry over into the students' careers. To borrow a concept from a

36. Several states have initiated p'rogramson professionalism for law students. For example, the Chief
Justice's Commission on Professionalism in Georgia has adopted an extensive program, mounted at all
Georgia law schools by attorney volunteers, who are specially trained'to work in two hour program segments
with material developed to guide new law students in professionalism considerations. Each program begins
with an address by ajustice of the Georgia Supreme Coun and is followed by attorney-led breakout sections
where students discuss hypothetical problems about ethics and professionalism which might arise in law
school or in practice. CHIEFJUSTICE'S CO~I~USSION Olli PROFESSIOlliAUSM, TEACHIlI:GPROFESSIOlliAUSM
Illi GEORGIA 7.
37. The inclusion of the professionalism CLE requirements for lawyers has been met with skepticism
in some quaners. Repetitive programs emphasizing the same "Lawyers Creed" have harmed the
professionalism movement more than helped it. CHIEFJUSTICE'S CO~BlISSION Oll: PROFESSIONAUS~I,
THE WORKI1\'G GROUP OF LAWYER C01\'DUCT }\1\'D PROFESSIOlliAUS~I, A NATIOlliAL ACTIOIIi
ON
L>\WYER C01\'DUCT AND PROFESSI01\'AUS~1 15 (1999). Recent eITons to address professionalism issues in
the context of particular substantive practice areas have been more successful. Guidelines for Professionalism
CLE programs have been issued in Georgia, Ohio, and several other states.

Pl."""
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1992 ABA task force report,38 legal education, and by extension
professionalism education, occurs along a continuum. Finally, introducing students to professionalism from their first day of law school lends
symbolic import to that moment in their professional character
development.
Even with these advantages, professionalism as a dimension of a
lawyer'S ethos presents real educational problems, largely because our
considerations of what professionalism means have too often been
considerations of superficial symptoms combined with quick fix cures.

B. Superficial Symptoms and Qyick Fix Cures
Civility
Arriving at the four broad challenges for professionalism education
started with the conviction that concern about the unbecoming conduct
of lawyers had limited rather than informed our understanding of
professionalism. The conflation of professionalism with civility is the
primary example of this limitation. While civility may be the result of
true professionalism, it is not co-extensive with it. The following are a
few examples of how we have tended to equate civility and professionalIsm.
The Supreme Court of Ohio's concern for professionalism grew out
of an observation that instances of unprofessional conduct were
increasing in frequency and severity.39 The Court's response was to
designate a committee to study existing creeds of professionalism. 40 The
work of this committee ultimately led to the formation of the Supreme
Court Commission on Professionalism in 1992, and the adoption in
1997 of the Statement on Prqfessionalism, A lAwyer's Creed, and A lAwyer's
Aspirational Ideals. In particular, A lAwyer's Creed addresses professionalism as a matter of conducting ourselves civilly vis-a.-vis others involved
in the legal system.
In 1998, the Columbus Bar Association developed one of the first
programs of the organized bar to address problems of civility. The

38. ABA SEC. 0" LEGAL Em;c. & AmllSSIONS TO THE BAR, TASK FORCE ON L ..,,· SCHOOL.'> AND
THE PROFESSIO:-\; NARRO\\'I:-\G THE GAP LEGAL EDtJCATIO:-\ AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOP~lE:-\T-A:-\
Em':CATIOXAL CO:\TIXL'DI 140 (1992) (hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. See infta notes 79-80.
39. Report of the Supreme Court Committee to Study Creeds of Professionalism 3 (December 1990)
(on file with author).
40. A 1998 count by the ABA totaled 106 examples of codes from courts, national, state and local
bar associations, and state professionalism commissions. ABA, PRO~IOTI;\,G PROFESSIO"AUS~I; ABA
PROGR:\~IS, PLO\XS, A;\'D STRATEGIES 53 (1998) (hereinafter PRmlOTING PROFESSIO;\,AUS\I].
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Civility Enhancement Program enables lawyers to lodge complaints with
the bar association, which may lead to efforts at conciliation. An express
goal of the program is to "promote and influence the attainment of an
enhanced standard of professionalism. ,,41
In August 2001, the Cincinnati Bar Association adopted the report of
the Civility Task Force, a part of which is a recommended Attorney
Code of Conduct. 42 A feature of the code is that members of the legal
community can pledge to promote professionalism and civility by calling
to have their names added to the list of endorsing attorneys. In all three
of these laudable efforts, professionalism and civility are presented as
virtually co-extensive. Or if not co-extensive, then civility is at least
presented as topic one under the heading "professionalism."
That civility leads the list of professionalism concerns is no surprise.
It is an obvious problem; it can make the practice oflaw unpleasant for
many lawyers; and it can be defined in behavioral, and therefore more
concrete, terms. We know civility (or incivility) when we see it.
Civility creeds and codes are not without their criticS. 43 Critics argue
that the civility movement, including CLE programs, focuses too much
on "making lawyers feel better about themselves," and on making the
public think more favorably of the profession rather than addressing
underlying problems of lawyer behavior. 44 Civility, it has been
suggested, is understood by some to be a "bumper sticker slogan, as in,
'have you hugged your adversary today.",45 It has also been suggested
that civility is a problem only in large law firm practices or in litigation
settings. Civility codes are criticized because "[t] hose lawyers who don't
need codes observe them, and those who do, don't."46
Yet, we are less willing to dismiss such efforts. 47 Rather, we believe
that civility initiatives are important, but recognize with Roger Cramton
of Cornell that" [c] ivility is not the core of the enterprise. It is like an

41. THE COLDlBCS BAR Ass':\", C(VIUTY PROGRA~(, at http:www.cbalaw.org(last visitedJan. 18,
2003).
42. CI:\"CJ:\":\"ATI BAR Ass':\" CJVIUTY TASK FORCE, CHARACTER COC:\TS: Foccs O:\"
CJVIUTY J:\" THE Lo\\\" (200 I) [hereinafter CHARACTER COC:\TS].
43. Thomas A. Gottschalk, CU'iJi!y COtlts: Treating the Symptom .Yot tM Disease, 1996 THE PROF. Lo\\\".

PROFESSJO:\":\US~I A:\"D

37.

44. /d.
45. Louis H. Pollak, Pn!ftssiOTUlIAttitudt, 84-ACG. A.B.A.J. 66 (1998) (quoting United States Supreme
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy). Justice Kennedy is critical of this superficial view of ci,·ility. He states,
"Civility is the mark of an accomplished and superb professional, but it is even more than this. It is an end
in itself." /d.
46. PRO~JOTI:\"G PROFESSJO:\"AUS~f, supm note 40, at 55.
47. See CHARACTER COC:\TS, supra note 42, for an excellent statement and practical list of
aspirational goals.
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elegant dessert, which dresses up and completes a good meal. The
nourishment," Cramton suggests, "lies elsewhere."48
Taking professionalism to mean civil behavior has focused our
attention too much on superficial conduct and too little on broader
themes. To make civil behavior understood as an important aspect of
professionalism, it must be presented as the logical manifestation of
embracing a professional's value system.
Competition and Commercialization
A second limitation on our understanding of the broad concept of
professionalism is our nostalgia for earlier times when practicing law was
"more a profession than a business." These memories are usually
accompanied by stories ofclients who paid, without question, sizable unitemized bills "for professional services rendered."
The character of this older form of law practice was collegial: a
fellowship, with some masters and some beginners, practicing a
historically rooted public craft founded upon an established body of
knowledge believed to be ennobling. Today's commercialized model
oflaw practice is not collegial in spirit. Nor is it even political, except
in the narrow sense implying contentiousness of conflicting desires. It
is corporate in form, competitive in character, and all too often
avaricious in aims. 49

Numerous factors are to blame for the perceived increasing commercialism of law practice ..}o Firms have gotten larger; lawyers have
multiple employment tracks; cases have gotten more complicated;
salaries have gone through roofs;51 mentoring is a memory; loyalty is
a thing of the past; and marketing and public relations (not to mention
advertising?2 are matters of day-to-day lawyering. 53 This description,
however, tells only half the picture. There are more women and
48. ROGER C. CRA~ITO:X, ABA SEC. 0:\ LEGAl. EDl:C. & AmIlSSIO:X TO THI; BAR o:x GIH:XG
I\(EA:XI:XG TO "PROFESSIO:XAUS~I" 7, 14 (1996).
49. William T. Braithwaite, Hearts and Minds: Can Ptuftsswnnlism Be Taught?, 76-SEP. A.B.A.J. 70, 70
(1990).
50. Ste generally Terry Carter, Law at 1M C,.ossroads, 88·;}.<\:X. A.B.A.J. 29 (2002).
51. Ste, e.g., http://www.greedyassociates.com/(Iast visited Jan. 18,2003).
52. Lawyer advertising has occasionally been a worry. Take the infamous Rosalie Osias, of Greal
Neck, New York, whose ads have been described as follows: "A woman itl a black leather miniskirt crouches
seductively over a motorcycle, vowing her company will 'ride anything' to accommodate a client's deadlines.
In another pose, the woman is draped across a desk, her heels kicked up behind her as she seductively biles
a pencil and intimates that her firm 'has a reputation ..... According to I\[s. Osias, "Sex sells. It sells
everything ill our society, why not legal services?" Di I\lari Ricker, 'Ad'.,rausrum: Has u'll!YtI' Ad"tI'lising Run
Amok?, 26 STl':DE:>.T LA\\,. 19 (1998). Seriously, don't these cases mke care of themselves?
53. Ste supm note 20.
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minorities in the profession; employment tracks are more flexible; new
areas of practice are opening, particularly related to technology; new
skills, largely entrepreneurial, are required; and the practice oflaw has
become less clubby and more democratic.
In short, it would be mistaken to blame economic forces leading to
the infusion of business and commercial concepts and attitudes into the
practice oflaw as the bane of professionalism. It is more likely the case
that lawyers and firms need to become more business-like to become
more professional. They must concentrate on adding value to client
matters and investing and developing human capital as examples of
positive lessons learne~ from business. 54
The Supreme Court of Ohio targeted competition as a cause of the
profession's troubles, suggesting this genesis in its 1997 Statement on
Professionalism. The Court said, "[T]rends ... developing among
lawyers in Ohio and elsewhere which emphasize commercialism in the
practice oflaw,,53 Were, along with incivility, reasons for the creation of
the Commission on Professionalism. Yet, good business practices are
client or customer-centered and have much to teach lawyers about what
is valuable in law practice. 56
Eliminating, or even diminishing, the commercial aspect ofpracticing
law does not pave the path to ptofessionalism. The concept of professionalism that takes the "American virtues of risk-taking, private
initiative, and competitive markets as vices in the practice oflaw ... is
inconsistent with both history and reality.,,57 The entrepreneurial
character of the practice oflaw has more often been a source of strength
than of weakness. Moreover, in the face of competitive issues like multidisciplinary practice and multijurisdictional practice, lawyers must be
both entrepreneurial and professional to survive. What lawyers must
learn is that respect and care for clients, colleagues, staff, and even
adversaries are best practices in both business and the profession.
Eliminating the entrepreneurial character ofpracticing law is not only
impossible but also undesirable, and avoiding the commercialism
typified by lawyer advertising is neither practical nor helpful in
understanding the essence of professionalism. Like civility, dignified
advertising, while perhaps desirable, should not be an end in itself but

54. See,e.g., DA\"lDH.l\I.O\ISTER, TRl:EPROFESSIO:-:ALIS~I: THECOl:RAGETOCAREABOLTYOl:R
PEOPLE, YOl:R CLIE:\TS, A:-:D YOl:R CAREER (1997); STEVEX KEEVA, TRA:-:SFOR~II:-:G PRACTICES:
FIxDI:-:GJOY AXD SATISFAGfIO:-: 1:-: THE LEGAL LIFE (1999); l\IIHALY CSIKSZE:\T~IIHALY & WIWA~I
DA~IOX, GOOD WORK: WHE:-: EXCELLEXCE AXD ETHICS !\IEET (200 I).
55. Statement on Professionalism Issued by the Supreme Court of Ohio (February 3, 1997).
56. &e, e.g., l\IAISTER, supra note 54; KEEVA, supra note 54.
57. CRA~ITOX, supra note 48, at 15.
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should result from a commitment to some more fundamental set of
values.
Bridge-the-Gap Programs
A customary fix for professionalism concerns has been correcting
behaviors and attitudes ofnew lawyers, leading to initiatives that address
professionalism more comprehensively in law school. This approach
assumes a consensus exists about what to teach, but that law schools are
not teaching it soon enough. As educators, we take this criticism with
no small amount of skepticism. Law schools playa very important role
in the professional education and training of lawyers, but student
readiness for professionalism instruction may be limited by the demands
of substantive course work and the absence of the client context.
Readiness quickly occurs once a law school graduate takes the oath and
begins representing real clients. This experience can be duplicated to
some degree in law school through clinical and internship experiences,
or even in some summer clerkships. But when the personal consequences are, at worst, a bad grade, the motivation is not the same as
when the admitted lawyer takes responsibility for the legal affairs of
another.
Bridge-the-Gap programs for new admittees are preferred by the
Supreme Court of Ohio. The Court has recently adopted a New
Lawyers Training obligation, required for the first time of those who
passed theJuly 2001 bar. It consists of twelve hours covering specific
subjects, and must be completed before the end of the year following
admission. The rule requires six hours of instruction on topics related
to the professional relationships and obligations oflawyers. 58 Skepticism
is warranted here, even though both authors were involved in the study
and adoption of Ohio's Bridge-the-Gap rules. Students must learn the
nuts-and-bolts, and such programs can start that process. To a lesser
extent, Bridge-the-Gap programs can continue the development of
professionalism started in law school, but it cannot substitute for
continued education in the profession.
Mentoring
Better mentoring of new lawyers has also been suggested as a quick
fix to professionalism problems. Structured mentoring programs, in
which mentors are assigned to junior lawyers, appeal to many because

58. St.:P. CT. RVLES FOR THE GOV'T OF OHIO X, Regulation 414(D)(4).
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senior lawyers, under numerous pressures, no longer devote time to
coaching and teaching new lawyers as they once used to do, informally,
as a matter of course. At first impression, assigning experienced
attorneys to nurture and train new attorneys makes common sense.
Though an excellent idea in theory, with respected antecedents, today,
assigned mentoring rarely works. The competitive pressures on practice
catalogued above do take their toll here. Simply, senior lawyers find
themselves too busy to mentor junior lawyers on a sustained basis.
Evidence also suggests that women receive less mentoring than men,j9
although both suffer.
Even though mentoring programs are difficult to implement and
sustain, they may nevertheless be worth trying, as mentoring can work
if certain conditions are present. First, mentoring works best when the
program is small and local, giving the mentor and the new lawyer an
opportunity to be in regular proximity. Second, mentoring requires
some affinity between the mentor and the new lawyer, or at least a belief
that each will be a credit to the other. In too many mentoring programs, mentors and mentees are assigned, giving too little attention to
either of these factors, or to a third important one, that the senior lawyer
and the new lawyer have enough in common so that they can talk easily
about subjects other than the practice oflaw. Third, the contacts must
be sustained over a long enough period of time for coaching lessons to
be effective. Finally, difficulties inherent in administering a program
must be addressed and overcome. Questions likely to arise for the
program administrator include who qualifies as a mentor, who decides
which mentor is assigned to which new lawyer, what are the expectations on each side of the relationship, and what happens if those
expectations are not met. 60
Because of difficulties in creating and maintaining necessary structures, mentoring programs are not the panacea they might at first
appear to be. Attorneys who enjoy mentoring should be encouraged to
continue to assist new lawyers in making the transition into the practice
oflaw, but reliance on assigned mentors will not solve our professionalism problems.
Attention to civility, undignified commercialization, new lawyer
training, and mentoring has enabled us to make progress toward
professionalism, and in fact these represent important initiatives and

59. C.HHU:'\ DO:,\:,\ELL ET AL., COLO. WmlE:,\'s BAR. Ass':,\, GE:'\OER PE:'\ALTIE.'>; THE RE.'>U.TS
OFTHE CAREERS ..\:'\0 CmfPE:'\SATIO:'\ Sn:OY 51-57 (1998).

60. For an excellent description of problems and practical solutions for mentoring programs, see
LI:\"OA PHILLIPS-JO:'\ES, ABA SECTIO:'\ OF LITIGATIO:\" A:\":'\t:AL FALL 1\1EETI:\"G CO~I~IO:\" PROBLE~IS 1:,\
PL.o\1\:,\ED ME:\TORI:,\G PROGR..\~fS (1992) (on file with author).
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discussions. Other undertakings might be mentioned here as well, such
as fulfilling pro bono obligations, which is a strong theme of the ABA. 61
Still, if professionalism is going to guide us to the aspirational goals
missing from black letter disciplinary codes, we must delve deeper to
.find a statement of the first values of the profession.

C. The First Values of Professionalism
Standard definitions of professionalism offer a place to start. One
favored definition was coined mid-century by Harvard Dean Roscoe
Pound, who said:
the term refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service-no less a public service because
it may incidentally be a means oflivelihood. Pursuit of the learned art
in the spirit of public service is the primary purpose.ti2

The Pound definition was recently updated and re-published in an
ABA publication, Teaching and Learning Professionalism, the 1996 report of
the Professionalism Committee ofthe American Bar Association Section
on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.63 Its authors adopted
Pound's approach, suggesting that the core of professionalism is public
service. The Report updated and expanded the definition, as follows:
A professional lawyer is an expert in law pursuing a learned art in
service to clients and in the spirit of public service, and engaging in
these pursuits as part of a common calling to promote justice and
public good.64

The Report goes on to list the "essential characteristics of the
professional lawyer," which are: (1) learned knowledge, (2) skill in
applying the applicable law to the factual context, (3) thoroughness of
preparation, (4) practical and prudential wisdom, (5) ethical conduct and
integrity, and (6) dedication to justice and the public good. 65 The
definition section ofthe report ends by noting that the "values underlying lawyer professionalism are aspirational in nature, unlike the
minimum standard" ofthe "ethical disciplinary rules.,,66

61.

PRO~IOTI:\G PROFF."SIO:\AUS~I,

supra note 40, at 75.

62. ROSCOE POl;:\D, THE l."\\'YER FRml A:\T1Qt:lTY TO l\IODER:\ TI~IF." 5 (1953).
ABA SEC. 0:\ LEGAL Em;c. & AmIlSSIO:\S TO THE BAR, REP. OF THE PROFF."SIO:\AUS~I

63.

Cml~IITrEE, TEACHI:\G A:\D LEAR:\I:\G PROFF."SIO:\AIJS~1

(1995) [hereinafter TEACHI:XG & LEARXI:\G

PROFF."SIO:\AUS~IJ.

64. /d. at 6.
65. /d. at 6-7.

66. /d. at 10.
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Professor Roger Cramton, in an exceptionally thoughtful essay,67
called for a reaffirmation of the central moral tradition of lawyering,
which he says is fully described in a 1958 ABA joint report on the
professional responsibilities of lawyers, authored primarily by Lon
Fuller.68 In Fuller's words, the lawyer's primary obligation is to the
"procedures and institutions of the law.,,69 Moreover, he continues, the
role of the lawyer within the legal system "imposes a trusteeship for the
integrity of those fundamental processes of government and selfgovernment upon which the successful functioning of our society
depends.,,70
Cramton suggests that the problem today is the professional ideology
that requires total commitment to clients.. He says, "[I]f 'client comes
first' meant only that the client's interest is superior to that of the lawyer,
it would be sound and praiseworthy. But the dominant view often
means that only client interests are respected, not those of courts, third
persons, and the public.,,71
He cites a number of reports that suggest that legal services today are
"market driven, with lawyers serving as expert technicians and hired
guns who view their work as a task-oriented coinmodity."n Cramton
speaks critically and notes the great symbolic importance of the ABA's
resistance to imposing upon lawyers a duty to disclose client confidences
when necessary to prevent or rectify client fraud where the lawyer's
services were used. 73
The Fuller report discussed the difficulty of bringing home to the law
student, the lawyer, and the public an understanding of the nature of the
lawyer's professional· responsibilities. 74 In the report, Fuller describes
how private practice can be a fomi of public service, saying "private
practice is a form of public service when it is conducted with an
appreciation of, and a respect for, the larger framework of government
of which it forms a part, including under the term government .
voluntary forms of self-regulation. 1l75

67. CR.'\~ITO:'\, supra note 48, at 20.
68. Lon L. Fuller &John D. Randall, PrqftssWnaI Responsihilily: Report riftheJoint Corifefence, 44 A.B.A.
J. 1159 (1958).
69. /d. at 162.
70. /d.
71. CR.'\~ITO:'\, supra note 48, lit 19.
72. /d.
73. ABA discussions of revisions to Rule 1.6(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the
most recent example of Cramton's point. See I\Iark Hansen, Model Ruks Rehab: House Tackks Tough issues as
f.lhics Dtbate Begins, 87·Qcr. A.B.A.J. 80 (2001) ..
74. Fuller & Randall, supra note 68, at 1162.
75. /d. By \'olunmry forms of self.regulation, Fulkr refe ... to those instances where parties set terms
under which they will come together to collabordte and to arrange their relationships: by forming
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Justice O'Connor's oft-quoted assessment of professionalism
similar, more recent, and noteworthy:

IS

To me, the essence of professionalism is a commitment to develop
one's skills and to apply [them] responsibly to the problems at hand.
Professionalism requires adherence to the highest ethical standards of
conduct, and a willingness to subordinate narrow self interest in
pursuit of the more fundamental goal of public service.

She continues:
Because of the tremendous power they wield in our system, lawyers
must never forget that their duty to serve their clients fairly and
skillfully takes priority over the personal accumulation of wealth. At
the same time, lawyers must temper bold advocacy for their clients
with a sense of responsibility to the larger legal system which strives,
however imperfectly, to provide justice for all. 76

Justice O'Connor's articulation, to a great degree, synthesizes and
simplifies the other definitions and aptly strikes four broad aspirational
themes: developing skills, adhering to ethical standards, serving clients
and the public, and taking responsibility to provide justice for all. These
challenges, basic and easily remembered, can serve as the right
foundational guides for law students, and form a broad foundation for
professionalism activities considered by bar associations and state
supreme courts. 77

D. Four Challenges ojPrqfissionalism
Skills Competence
Achieving and maintaining competence in a wide range of analytical
and operational skills lies at the core of professionalism. The challenge
is to understand that achieving and maintaining competence is not
separate from professionalism, but one of its first principles. To
embrace the notion that competence is more than technical skills is
corporations, partnerships, labor unions, clubs, and churches; by entering contracts and leases, and by
engaging in other large and small transactions through which their rights and duties toward one another arc
defined. /d. "Within this larger framework the lawyer must seek the answer to what he must do, the limits
of what he must do." /d. He goes on to say that "partisan advocacy is a form of public service so long as it
aids the process of adjudication; it ceases to be when it hinders that process, when it misleads, distorts and
obfuscates, when it renders the task of the deciding tribunal not easier but more difficult." /d.
76. COt;RT OF ApPEAL..., OF l\ID., PROFESSIO;\"AUS~I COL"RSE FOR NEW AD~lrn·EES TO THE MD.
BAR, PROFF~'lSI01\AUS~I: ABOVE A;\"D BEYO:\D ETHICS (1992) (on file with author).
77. C01\F. Qt' CHIEF JL"STICES, NATI01\AL ACTIO;\" PI_<\:\ Ol' L.<\WYER COl'DL"CT Al'D
PROFESSIO;\"AUS~I

(1999).
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likewise critical. Meeting this challenge means not only mastering a
certain body of substantive knowledge and a set of lawyering skills, but
also applying them both with independent judgment and practical
wisdom. 78
The 1992 Report on Law Schools and the Prqftssion,79 known as the
MacCrate Report after its primary author, Robert MacC rate ,80
identifies as the first fundamental value of the profession, "the Provision
of Competent Representation.,,81 The ABA's Standing Committee on
Lawyer Competence captured this challenge well when it emphasized
that, "Law is a craft that endeavors to shape its work with balance and
precision, that rejects imperfection and flaw, that values dispassionate
analysis, that is conscious and sensitive, and that understands that one
apt word or phrase can clarify an issue, or convert contention into
consensus. ,,82 Understanding law is a craft that elicits pride and
responsibility. This tradition gives competence a special meaning and
emphasizes it as a crucial element of professionalism.
Integrity
The second challenge calls for lawyers to act with integrity, or what
Justice O'Connor refers to as the highest ethical standards. Many
people think of professionalism exclusively as a higher form of ethics,
calling for us to do what the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires, and then to do it with respect for the relationships lawyers must
maintain with the others who inhabit the legal system. The Ohio
Lawyer's Creed, written in terms of the character of the relationships we
have with judges, lawyers, our colleagues in our firms, our clients, and
finally with the public at large, seems to take this view. 83

78. Jerome]. Shestack, Taking Prl!fessionalism Serious{y, 84-AUG. A.B.A.]. 73 (1998).
79. 1\1ACCRATE REPORT, supra note 38. The MACCRATEREPORTisa thorollgh and comprehensive
study listing ten fundamental skills and four values of the legal professional. The Report explains each of
these in great detail and is recommended to you for your reading. For our purposes, we have reduced the
se\'eral skills and \'alues of the MACCRATE REPORT into four challenges of professionalism. The
fundamental skills are: Problem Solving; Legal Analysis and Reasoning; Legal Research; Factual
Investigation; Communication; Counseling; Negotiation; Litigation and Alternate Dispute Resolution;
Organization and Management of Legal Work; and, Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas. The
fundamental \'alues are: Provision of Competent Reputation; Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness and
Morality; Striving to Improve the Profession; and, Professional Self-De\,elopment.
80. Robert MacCrate is senior counsel with Sullivan & Cromwell; he is a past president of the ABA,
and the State Bar of New York.
81. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 207.
82. PRO~IOTING PROFESSIONALIS~I, supra note 40, at 43.
83. SUP. CT. OHIO, A LAWYER'S CREED (1997).
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Although the ethical integrity of the lawyer must be the profession's
first commitment, the ethics rules of today are primarily a set of
behavioral rules. "Acting with integrity" is the phrase which seems to
capture better the idea of a value system, a mind-set, a responsibility
that should remain constantly in the lawyer's consciousness8 as well as
the idea of acting accordingly.8s Just as competence is more than a set
of technical skills, acting with integrity is more fundamental than simply
staying out of trouble with the grievance committee.
Service
Meeting the challenge of integrity in the profession lies largely in reaffirming the central moral tradition of lawyering. 86 That tradition
asserts that the lawyer's primary obligation is, in Fuller's words quoted
earlier, to the "procedures and institutions of the law,,,87 which leads to
the third challenge, making a commitment to a life of service.
If service to others is the central commitment of a lawyer's professional life, then the challenge of this aspect of professionalism is to
understand service in a more complex way than volunteering in
community organizations or doing pro bono work. These are important
undertakings, but the more complicated challenge is to reconsider and
re-embrace the understanding ofclient service as taking place within the
tradition of service to the public. 88 In the words of Professor Cramton,
Representation of private clients serves public goals ... when lawyer
professionalism [1] encourages lawyers to assist clients in refining their
objectives in the light of moral concerns, [2] channels client conduct
in law-abiding paths, and [3] subordinates the interests of clients in
those less common situations in which a client's wrongful conduct
threatens serious injury to third persons or to the integrity ofjudicial
process. 89

Justice O'Connor likewise calls for the subordination of narrow self
interest to the more fundamental goal of public service.

84. PROMOTING PROFESSIONi\USM, supra note 40, at 9.
85. See supra Part I. Several commentators have noted the transition in this century from the 1908
Canons of Ethics, which werc aspirational in nature, to thc Model Rules, adopted in 1983 by the ABA,
which set forth black leller rules for ethical beha\'ior. The l\-Iodel Rules have come to be regarded, not as
minimum standards beyond which all lawyers should strivc, but as the maximum standards of ethical
beha\'ior, in other words, not a floor, but a ceiling.
86. CRi\MTON, supra note 48, at 18·19.
87. Fuller & Randall, supra note 68, at 1162.
88. PoUND, supra note 62, at 9·10.
89. CRi\MTON,.l'Upranote48,at 16·17.
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Recent writings on professionalism have begun to address with
greater emphasis the problem of "hired gun" advocacy.90 According to
Russell Pearce, Director of Fordham's Center for Law and Ethics,
"Persuading today's elite lawyers of an obligation to the public good
requires a new understanding, with two objectives. First, commitment
to the public good must be reconciled with the acknowledgment that law
is a business. Second, the hired gun's principle of moral non-accountability must end.,,91
To achieve the goal of service to private clients as a form of public
service, attorneys must more strongly reclaim the independence of
judgment for which our services are sought. Jerome Shestack, President
of the ABA in 1997-1998, for whom Professionalism was the theme of
his presidential year, notes that today, too many lawyers, acting out of
enthusiasm to gain and keep their clients, "are willing to forego their
independent judgment and adherence to professional values to do
whatever the client asks." For these lawyers, the desire for economic
gain and the culture of the marketplace have been allowed to override
independent judgment. 92
The challenge, then, in making a commitment to practice law in
service to one's clients and the public good is in finding the proper
balance between zealous advocacy on the one hand, and independent
judgment and moral accountability on the other.
SeekingJustice
The fourth and final challenge of professionalism is seekingjustice for
all as a priority of our legal institutions. This challenge may be divided
into two parts: Part one is assuring the quality onegal representation for
those unable to afford it. The challenge associated with the distribution
oflegal services remains unsolved partly because there is no agreement,
except at the rhetorical level, about what the problems are. 93
In her recent book, In the Interests qfJustice: Riforming the Legal Prqfession,
Deborah Rhode of Stanford University asserts that the public is

90. See, e.g., Scott Smith, Troth and Justice on the Scqlfold: A Critique c!f"Hired Gun" Adt'Octuy, 62 TE."\:. BJ.
1096 (\999); Russell G. Pearce, Retreat c!fthe Elite, 23 AMER. L>\w. 79 (2001).
91. Pearce, supra note 90. The first step will be distinguishing loyalty to the client from hired gun
advocacy. One quality the public highly values is that lawyers are faithful in protecting the interests of their
clients. At the same time, the quality the public identifies as the least desirable is the lawyer's perceived
willingness to bend the rule to the point of breaking (or further) to serve a client's interests. "People hate a
hired gun until they need one of their own." DEBORAH L RHODE, IN THE Jl\'TERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFOR~IING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7 (2000).
92. Shestack, supra note 78, at 73.
93. RHODE, supra note 91, at 17.
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ambivalent about the connection between money and justice. Americans dislike the idea that law is accessible only to the wealthy, but our
social policies in recent years have not provided a remedy to the
problem of legal services for the poor, much less those of moderate
income. 94 The MacCrate Report, referred to earlier, identifies an
obligation to provide pro bono service as one offour fundamental values
of the profession,95 but surveys indicate that the average annual pro
bono contribution for lawyers is less than eighty-five dollars. 96
One development which may seem counter-intuitive on the issue of
legal services for the public is the growth of public interest law. When
the Office of Equal Opportunity Legal Services Program was created in
1965,97 meeting the legal needs of the poor was determined to be the
responsibility, not of the bar at large, but of a smaller group of dedicated
public interest lawyers who, out of that dedication, were willing to take
lower salaries to ensure that the law might be available to those without
funds to pay. The emergence of public interest law as a specialty of
practice has enabled the legal profession to place the burden of meeting
the professionalism challenge of seeking justice for all on the shoulders
of a few lawyers. As economic pressures on private firm lawyers have
increased, this has been a convenient shift.
The development of public interest practice has greatly benefited
society, and the attorneys who contribute their pro bono hours are to be
commended and recognized. However, the limitations on the type of
work public interest lawyers can do and the threatened de-funding of
LSC in 1981, suggest that the professionalism challenge of ')ustice for
all" is one we ought not in good conscience leave to one segment of the
bar or assume is resolved.
The second part of the challenge of seeking justice is the openness of
the profession to diversity. In the words of a recent ABA publication,
"A system beset by bias, whether racial, gender, ethnic or in other
forms, cannot render equal justice.,,98 To further the end of equal
justice, one of the most serious challenges of professionalism must be to
seek the full and equal participation of minorities and women in the
profession. 99

94. /d. at 7; PRoMOTl:-.'G PROFESSIO:-.'AUSM, supra nOle 40, at 63·64.
95. l\-IACCRATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 214.
96. RHODE, supra note 91, at 5.
97. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 736 (200 I).
98. PRO~10TlNG PROFESSIONAUSM, supra note 40, lit 62.

99. /d. Ironically, diversity in the profession is sometimes named as part of the reason for a decline

of professionalism. Under this theory, when women and minorities came into the profession in significant
numbers, they undermined the profession's ability to identify and perpetuate a commitment to the common
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The legal profession cannot claim the high moral ground of seeking
justice for all and at the same time neglect barriers to the successful
participation of women and minorities in the legal profession. Numerous reports show us how, but response has been sluggish. For example,
the recent publication, "The Unfinished Agenda," by the ABA
Commission on Women in the Profession, concludes that equality for
women in the profession continues to be elusive. Few of the problems
reflect intentional discrimination; women's opportunities are limited by
traditional gender schema and inflexible workplace structures, to name
just two remaining issues. 100
Meeting these four challenges requires first that we think about the
concept of professionalism as both simpler and more profound than
adhering to particular kinds of conduct, eliminating commercialism and
entrepreneurial efforts, or teaching new law students or new lawyers the
correct values before they go wrong. Professionalism education means
going beyond these worthy efforts to consider the first principles of
achieving and maintaining competence, acting with integrity, committing to service, and seeking justice for all. 101
We can draw upon numerous examples from our lives as lawyers to
develop the ideal of professionalism. At the most fundamental level,
representing a client to help that client realize ambitions or goals, or to
avoid the imposition of power resides at the heart of justice. If that
representation is undertaken competently, independently, and without
conflict, then justice will be served. Legal representation is an awesome
responsibility, and individual reflection on its application goes to the
core of professionalism.

~ers as America's Gomning Class; The Formation and Dissolution,!! fhe Origintd
Understanding,!! the American ~er's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 412 (200 I).
100. DEBORAH L. RHODE, A.B.A. CmlMISSIONONWOMEN INTHEPROF~SION, THE UNFINISHED
AGEXDA: WmlEx A~D THE LEGAL PRO~SIOX 6 (200 I).
101. The practical challenge presented to legal educators and to judges and lawyers involved in

good. Russell G. Pearce,

professionalism continuing legal education is to convert these concepts into a list of concrete steps that law
students and lawyers will find more immediately applicable. In making that com'ersion, a long list of
suggested issues and topics have been identified by Profession~lism Commissions as appropriate for
professionalism CLE.
Ohio Professionalism CLE Guidelines state expressly that the ideals and values in the Lawyers
Creed and the Aspirational Ideals which were adopted in 1997, as well as those in the more recently adopted
Judicial Creed (200 I), should be used to suggest issues and subjects that lawyers and judges need to examine
as they strive to meet the lofty goals and ideals, and to achieve the highest standards of a learned profession.
St:PRE~IE COURT OF OHIO COM~IlSSI0N ON PROF~SIONAUSM,PROFESSIONAUSM CLE GUlDEUN~
Gun. 14,2002), at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/CP/guidelines.pdf.
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CONCLUSION

Clearly, professionalism is a concept broader than legal ethics. Yet,
in our minds and in our discussions, legal ethics precedes professionalism for several reasons. First and most obviously, it is a fact that legal
ethics precedes professionalism as a historical matter. A discussion of
ethics pervades the 19th and 20th centuries, and professionalism is late
to arrive at the tail end of the 20th century. It is also the case that legal
ethics rules as we have come to know them are more congenial to the
formal legalistic mind. As lawyers we understand better how to read,
interpret, dissect, and apply rules, than how to define, understand, and
achieve aspirational standards. We have, after all, been educated as
Holmes's bad man.
Next, the fact that ethics precedes professionalism is reinforced as the
legal profession undergoes dramatic changes. More specifically, the
profession, with increased competition and decreased loyalty, finds
disciplinary rules easier both to administer and to understand, while
finding aspirational standards not only difficult to define, but also not
economically worth the effort. finally, the lack of a dear or accepted
definition of professionalism makes an attempt to codify it difficult, if not
impossible. 102
Legal ethics and professionalism are distinct but related ways of
thinking about lawyer's obligations. Professionalism can be a much less
maligned idea if we articulate. the proper relationship between legal
ethics and professionalism. Further, we must understand that although
professionalism is a broader idea, it nevertheless has distinctive
characteristics. Where legal ethics is rule ..based, event-specific,
retrospective, and disciplinary, calling for the exercise ofgood judgment,
professionalism is standard-based, career-long, prospective, and
aspirational, calling for the exercise of wisdom.
Ethics 2000 and The Law Governing Lawyers present an opportunity for
lawyers to reassess their professional codes in light of modern developments and maybe even with an eye on professionalism. This is a
challenge for neither the weak-willed nor the short-winded; but it is a
challenge worth undertaking for the improvement ofthe legal profession
which comes with being a member of the bar.
These interactions are the stuff of better education. 103
102. Despite scholarship of Pound, Cramton, Stanley, Redlick, l\IacCrate, etc., the only good
definition of professionalism is the one you develop for yourself.
103. TEACHING & LEARNING PROFESSIONAUSM, supra note 63; ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDCC. AND
AmIISSIONS TO THE BAR, PROFESSIONAUS~f CO~IMIlTEE& STASDING COM~UlTEF.s ON PROFESSIOl\A.
US~I AND L~WYER COMPETENCE OF THE ABA CTR. FOR PROF. RE.'iPOSSIBIUTY, TEACHING AND
LEAR:\,I:\'G PROFESSIONAUSM: SnlPOSImI PROCEEDISGS (October 2.4, 1996).
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